Enhancing Security Protocol For Voip Communication Using Modified Vector Quantization by Jaafar, Mohd Yazid Mohd
ENHANCING SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR
VOIP COMMUNICATION USING
MODIFIED VECTOR QUANTIZATION
MOHD YAZID MOHD JAAFAR
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA
2013
ENHANCING SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR
VOIP COMMUNICATION USING
MODIFIED VECTOR QUANTIZATION
by
MOHD YAZID MOHD JAAFAR
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Science
July 2013
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Associate Professor Azman
Samsudin, for sharing his passion, knowledge and guidance during my research at
School of Computer Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia. His enthusiasm in work has
always motivate me, and his effort is so much to be admired. Thank you so much.
I want to thanks all of the staff in School of Computer Sciences, Universiti Sains
Malaysia, particularly Mrs. Azlina Yusof and Mr. Redzuan Asmi. With their help, I
manage to get through all my candidature matters with ease.
I would like to take this oppurtunity to thank my beloved parents, Hj. Mohd Jaafar
Hj. Abdul Gani and Hjh. Fulanatin Hj. Mukri, as well as my sisters Umi Mahmudah
and Siti Maisarah. Their unlimited support and true love had keep my faith and spirit
on top everytime I face a tough time. They stand by me, raised me, supported me,
tought me, and love me. To them I dedicate this thesis.
I would like to thank the person who share my happiness and saddes. The person
who supported me and provided me with a caring environment and unforgettable mo-
ments. Thank you Danya Ayesya Abdull Razak. To my friends, Alfin Syafalni, Iqmal
Rahiman and Hafiz awang, thank you for coloring my life. Hope we can achieve to-
gether whatever things that we always imagined.
Mohd Yazid Mohd Jaafar
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Abstrak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Research Motivation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Research Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Research Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6 Research Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.7 Research Contribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.8 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Signaling and Media Transport Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.2 Session Description Protocol (SDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.3 Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Threats Against VoIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
iii
2.4 Public Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Public Key Infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.1 Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.2 PKI Implementation and Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Symmetric Encryption and Decryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6.1 Block Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6.2 Stream Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Current Security Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.8 Verbal Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.8.1 Zimmerman’s RTP (ZRTP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.8.2 VIPSec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.9 Other Authentication Protocol for VoIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.10 Image Metric. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.11 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
CHAPTER 3 – SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR VIDEO CALL IN VOIP
BASED ON MODIFIED VECTOR QUANTIZATION
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Solution Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.1 Solution Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.2 Protocol Attributes and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.3 Protocol Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.4 Prototype Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
iv
3.3.1 Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.2 Reverse Hash Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.3 Key Continuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4 Image Metric Generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.1 Image Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.2 Modified Vector Quantization (MVQ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENTAL RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Testing Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Computational and Communication Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5.1 Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5.2 Modified Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.5.3 Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.5.4 Guessing Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.5.5 Denning-Sacco Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.5.6 Stolen-verifier Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.5.7 Server spoofing Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5.8 Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5.9 Known-Key Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.5.10 Key Control Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5.11 Unknown-Key Share Resilience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
v
CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2 Future Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
List of Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1 SDP options and its usage 22
Table 2.2 Comparison of different algorithms in block and stream cipher 43
Table 3.1 Type of signal in the message format 67
Table 4.1 Comparison of computational and communication cost of
different authentication protocols for VoIP 91
Table 4.2 Comparison of different algorithms in block and stream cipher 102
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1.1 Major components in VoIP system (Dantu et al., 2009) 3
Figure 1.2 The application of cryptography to secure the VoIP
communication 8
Figure 1.3 Steps involved in the research works 10
Figure 2.1 Overview of the literature review 17
Figure 2.2 VoIP stack, adapted from (Gupta and Shmatikov, 2007) 18
Figure 2.3 SIP protocol handshake between Alice and Bob (Wang and Liu,
2010) 20
Figure 2.4 DH key exchange (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) 28
Figure 2.5 MITM attack on DH key exchange (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) 29
Figure 2.6 RSA key exchange (Katz and Lindell, 2008) 33
Figure 2.7 Asymmetric key (Hellman, 2002) 34
Figure 2.8 The mechanism of TTP in PKI (Hunt, 2001) 36
Figure 2.9 Encryption and decryption using symmetric key (Katz and
Lindell, 2008) 38
Figure 2.10 Components of Secure RTP (SRTP) packet (Blom et al., 2002) 44
Figure 2.11 Stages in image recognition process 51
Figure 2.12 Example of subspace partition 55
Figure 3.1 Components of the proposed security protocol 58
Figure 3.2 Framework of the proposed security protocol 60
Figure 3.3 SIP signal flow with the proposed authentication protocol 61
Figure 3.4 The signal flow of the proposed security protocol 64
Figure 3.5 Message format of the proposed security protocol 67
Figure 3.6 The signal flow of key continuity mode 73
viii
Figure 3.7 Image metric 76
Figure 3.8 Difference between a) original VQ approach and b) the MVQ
approach 78
Figure 3.9 Example of averaging process on a) the Lenna image based on
b) 4 by 4, c) 8 by 8, d) 16 by 16 and e) 32 by 32 subspace size. 79
Figure 4.1 Color variances from physical movement 84
Figure 4.2 Comparison between VQ and MVQ relative to packet drop 85
Figure 4.3 Behavior of VQ and MVQ approaches on different t duration 87
Figure 4.4 Relation of subspace size with different level of packet drop 88
Figure 4.5 Time overheads in processing single frame with different
subspace size 89
Figure 4.6 Time overheads in processing multiple frames 90
Figure 4.7 A MITM attack 94
Figure 4.8 The use of old SSK in perfect forward secrecy 99
ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AES Advance Encryption Standard
CA Certificate Authority
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDLP Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
IGF Image metric Generation Function
IV Initial Value
MAC Message Authentication Code
MIKEY Multimedia Internet Keying
MITM Man In The Middle
MVQ Modified Vector Quantization
NP-hard Non-deterministic Polynomial-hard
PKC Public Key Cryptography
x
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PRNG Pseudo-random Number Generator
QoS Quality of Service
RA Registration Authority
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RTCP Real-time Transport Control Protocol
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension
SAS Short Authentication String
SDES Security Description
SDP Session Description Protocol
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SRTP Secure RTP
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTP Trusted Third Party
UDP User Datagram Protocol
VA Validation Authority
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
xi
VQ Vector Quantization
ZID ZRTP ID
ZRTP Zimmerman’s RTP
xii
MEMPERBAHARUI PROTOKOL
KESELAMATAN UNTUK KOMUNIKASI
VOIP MENGGUNAKAN VEKTOR
KUANTISASI TERUBAH
ABSTRAK
VoIP telah menerbitkan cabaran baru yang tidak pernah didengar ketika talian telefon
tetap masih digunakan. Protokol Permulaan Sesi (SIP) biasa digunakan sebagai proto-
kol utama dalam VoIP. Namun, tiadanya kemudahan sekuriti telah mendedahkan SIP
kepada banyak ancaman rangkaian. Infrastruktur Kekunci Awam (PKI) digunakan se-
bagai lapisan pengesahan tetapi ia memerlukan kos. Pengesahan melalui percakapan
adalah protokol keselamatan yang khas untuk VoIP. Malangnya, pengguna perlu me-
laksanakan protokol ini secara manual. Kajian ini mencadangkan protokol keselamat-
an untuk panggilan video dalam VoIP tanpa bergantung kepada PKI. Ia menggunakan
metrik imej bagi melindungi kunci awam. Protokol ini tidak bergantung kepada si-
jil dan menggunakan kepandaian manusia untuk mengesahkan pemanggil. Pengguna
tidak perlu bercakap dan membandingkan kod pengesahan secara manual lagi. Vek-
tor Kuantisasi Terubah (MVQ) dan Fungsi Generasi Metrik Imej (IGF) turut diperke-
nalkan bagi meningkatkan kebolehpercayaan protokol ini terhadap isu-isu rangkaian.
Keputusan eksperimen menunjukkan protokol ini adalah kukuh, boleh dipercayai dan
praktikal untuk panggilan video dalam VoIP. Analisis keselamatan juga telah membuk-
tikan bahawa protokol ini mampu menahan serangan ke atas VoIP.
xiii
ENHANCING SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR
VOIP COMMUNICATION USING
MODIFIED VECTOR QUANTIZATION
ABSTRACT
VoIP has introduced a new set of challenge that practically unheard off when a landline
phone was used. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is often used as the main signaling
protocol in VoIP. However, the lack of security feature has exposed SIP to a num-
ber of network threats. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is widely used to provide the
authentication layer, but incurs maintenance cost. Verbal authentication is a security
protocol specifically developed for VoIP. Unfortunately, user needs to manually per-
form the authentication steps over the phone. This study proposed a security protocol
for video call in VoIP that does not relies on PKI. It uses image metric to secure the
public key. The protocol is a certificate-less and uses human intelligence in authen-
ticating the caller. User does not need to speak and compare the authentication code
manually. Modified Vector Quantization (MVQ) and Image Metric Generation Func-
tion (IGF) are also introduced to help increase the reliability of the security protocol
against network issues. The experimental results have demonstrated that the proposed
protocol is robust, reliable and practical for video call in VoIP communication. The
security analysis also has proved that the proposed protocol can resist known attacks
against VoIP communication.
xiv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
People have always been fascinated by the new technologies that allow them to be
more connected and feel so close to somebody they care. It is even more satisfying if
all of the technologies are just a click away, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is
one of them. Most new technologies come with their own set of inperfection and VoIP
is no exception. Currently, session privacy and information confidentiality are major
concerns among VoIP’s user which need to be addressed.
This chapter presents the overview of VoIP infrastructure and the security concern
surrounding its implementation. Section 1.2 describes the research problem studied
in this research. Research motivation and the scope of this research are explained
in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 respectively. Section 1.5 explains the goal and the
objectives of this study whereas Section 1.6 presents the research methodology used
to achieve the objectives. The contribution of this research is described in Section 1.7,
followed by the organization of this thesis in Section 1.8.
1.1 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
VoIP technology is recognized as low cost, highly scalable as well as flexibile. In
contrast to the phone line, VoIP does not have any geographical restrictions since the
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system uses a single user ID which can uniquely identify the user across the globe.
In terms of personal usage, VoIP gives an extra mobility to the user who often on the
move. Since audio and video data are digitized in the form of network packet, the
aggregation of VoIP communication and existing IP network will help in reducing the
overall operating cost.
A VoIP system consists of three major components namely Session Initiation Pro-
tocol (SIP) Server, SIP Proxy and User Agent (Zhang et al., 2010). Figure 1.1 ilustrates
some of the major component in VoIP system. SIP Server manages user information,
session tracking and database interaction. It usually contains SIP Registrar, a logical
entity that handles participant registration and links the Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI) address with a given IP address. As its name implies, SIP Proxy serves as the
intermediate server that sit closer to the respective endpoint and forward the client
request. A User Agent is the actual endpoint in VoIP communication that interacts
directly with the user. Such endpoint can be in the form of softphone installed on the
client’s terminal or a physical phone that connected to VoIP gateway via PSTN or PBX
network.
Despite the significant benefits offered, VoIP has introduced a new set of problems
which are practically unheard off when a conventional phone line was used. The use
of circuit-switched network in the phone line system has secured the communication
signal until the physical layer. Replicating the same feat in VoIP is a formidable task
since the whole system are normally deployed on an existing IP network. As a result,
VoIP has inherited all vulnerabilities faced by such network such as denial of service,
eavedropping and impersonation(Butcher et al., 2007).
2
Figure 1.1: Major components in VoIP system (Dantu et al., 2009)
VoIP has two important aspects that need to be preserved, namely information con-
fidentiality and session integrity (Butcher et al., 2007; Dantu et al., 2009). Information
confidentiality means the prevention of information disclosure from the unauthorized
individuals or systems whereas session integrity concerns on the protection of the iden-
tity of caller, receiver and the message. Preserving these two aspects would require a
formalize security protocol to authenticate the shared key as well as to verify the user
identity.
With the explosive growth of social network, communication privacy has become
a major concern among VoIP user. It is more often than not where VoIP system is
used not only for people to talk about general events in life, but also to convey secret
information. Therefore, it is important for the service provider to give the security
assurance to the user by integrating information confidentiality and session integrity
aspects in their service implementation.
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VoIP system is usually implemented on top of existing IP network. Such network
is often under constant attacks by the adversary which causes VoIP to inherit its vul-
nerabilities (Bradbury, 2007). This makes VoIP system prone to active and passive
attacks through the underlying network. A passive attack is one in which the intruder
eavesdrops but does not modify the message stream in any way. An active attack is one
in which the intruder may transmit messages, replay old messages, modify messages
in transit, or delete selected messages from the session. A typical active attack is one
in which an intruder impersonates one end of the conversation, or acts as a man-in-the-
middle. In comparison, conventional phone system utilizes a circuit-switched network
in routing the communication line. This guarantees a secure communication down to
the physical layer. Tapping the physical communication line is the only way to breach
its security.
Authentication, eavesdropping and impersonation are three issues that contribute
to the security risk of VoIP (Keromytis, 2010). Without a reliable authentication, an
adversary can masquerade as someone else or silently listen into the conversation. To
avert this situation, public key exchange was employed to establish the shared key prior
to the beginning of a session lifetime (Yang et al., 2005). The generated shared key will
be used for encryption and decryption process on the subsequent VoIP’s data. However,
such method is not fully foolproof and some loopholes have been identified. Detailed
on this matter and other existing approaches will be further explained in Chapter 2.
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1.2 Research Problem
Eavesdropping and impersonation are two major issues in VoIP communication. How-
ever, as the primary protocol in VoIP, SIP does not provide a security mechanism to
create a secure communication channel. Instead, SIP relies on other security protocols
to achieve such task, particularly Secure RTP (SRTP). Nevertheless, the design flaw
caused by false assumption between its components at different layers of VoIP stack
has rendered SRTP unreliable. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is widely accepted in
providing the security layer in VoIP communication. Since PKI requires maintenance
cost particularly to subscribe and renew the certificate, replacing PKI with other viable
method seems logical. Verbal authentication provides the alternative solution. The
method uses human intelligence to authenticate the user. However, user needs to read
and verify the authentication string manually over the phone which is time consum-
ing. Therefore, there is a need to develop a formalized security protocol specifically
for VoIP communication that can eliminate the manual verification process and at the
same time does not rely on the PKI
To address these issues, this study proposed an alternative security protocol for
video call in VoIP based on image metric derived from feature descriptor from the
media stream. Image metric act as a biometric key that is unique in each session
to secure the public key transmission. The nature of real-time media streaming in
VoIP and the human intelligence is utilized in the decision making process. Human
involvement is very minimal and they do not have to undergo the manual authentication
process.
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1.3 Research Motivation
VoIP session often involves video call. Due to its nature, every image frame in the
video presents a very large entropy size due to the massive number of pixels. There-
fore, these pixels can be used to generate a biometric key by using a feature extrac-
tion method. This ensures that the generated key is unique. Generating key from the
video before and after the transmission give VoIP application the ability to perform
key agreement and create the shared key without relying on PKI or human interaction.
Hence, a large portion of time and processing overhead can be saved.
In addition, human brain has unparalleled neural processing and decision making
capability. There are three aspects that human intelligence can play a role in VoIP se-
curity. Human can notice any difference in voice tone and able to combine visual and
hearing perceptive ability to spot any abnormality between the physical action and the
movement of lips. Doing the same process on the computer would require an intense
image processing and complex neural network. Exploiting the human intelligence as a
final decision maker instead of neural network can save memory and space consump-
tion in the software implementation.
These two ideas are the motivation behind this study. There is a need for an alter-
native security protocol for VoIP without relying on the PKI or verbal authentication.
The nature of VoIP stream and human intelligence can be utilized for developing the
solution. Given the combination of image based key generation and human neural ca-
pacity, such solution is the most effective way in providing secure VoIP session among
known user without degrading the security strength.
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1.4 Research Scope
The security of SIP signaling outside of the session lifetime is highly dependent on
the underlying IP network. Given the circumstances of the network and the number
of existing security solutions, such domain is not covered in this study. This study
emphasizes on protecting information confidentiality and the session integrity.
A single cryptography scheme may solve one issue but not the other. For example,
key exchange scheme handle the key agreement without exposing the secret key but
cannot verify the key sender. Whereas PKI can verify the key sender but incur extra
cost. Therefore, a collective approach consists of multiple cryptography components
is needed. Figure 1.2 illustrates some of the cryptography area that has been utilized to
improve the security level in VoIP communication. The focus of this research are SIP
signaling, public key exchange, encryption and verbal authentication.
The proposed work in this study is based on verbal authentication. Therefore, the
assumptions made in verbal authentication would also apply. First, the sender (caller)
and the receiver (callee) have known each other prior to the session under the premise
that people only add a friend that they know on their VoIP’s friend list. The familiarity
should allow them to visually identify their identity. Second, the session has to take
place in real-time.
The research scope in this study is limited to video call in the sense that the user
can determine the identity much better if they can visually see the caller and therefore,
impersonation is highly impossible. Here are the main talking points to summarize the
research scope:
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1. Emphasis on the session lifetime; a data streaming phase between SIP’s ACK
and BYE signal.
2. Aim to fulfill Confidentiality and Integrity aspects within the session lifetime.
3. Focus on SIP signaling, public key exchange, encryption and verbal authentica-
tion.
4. VoIP session involves only known peers and take place in real-time.
5. The proposed work is specifically developed for video call in VoIP.
1.5 Research Objective
The goal of this research is to develop an alternative security protocol for video call in
VoIP communication based on image metric from the media stream. The proposed pro-
tocol takes the advantage of real-time video transmission in digesting the image metric
independently and secures the public key during the key exchange. The objectives of
this research are:
1. To design a security protocol for video call in VoIP without relying on the PKI.
2. To develop a formalized method in generating a unique biometric key from real-
time video transmission in VoIP by using the feature extraction technique on
multiple image frames.
3. To eliminate the need for user to manually read and compare the authentication
string over the phone.
9
1.6 Research Methodology
A large portion of the research works are spent during the process of designing the
solution. Figure 1.3 illustrates the steps involved in the research. The works are done
based on four major components, namely key agreement, encryption, hash function
and image metric generation. In each component, several options are considered based
on the given requirement.
Figure 1.3: Steps involved in the research works
The proposed protocol utilized Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key ex-
change scheme to negotiate the key between the participants. ECDH is based on point
multiplication on the elliptic curve graph, known as Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
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Problem (ECDLP). It produces a smaller key size but retain the same security strength
as the DH. This reduce the time and processing overhead of overall solution. Advance
Encryption Standard (AES) is used to encrypt the public key from ECDH scheme with
the generated image metric. Sosemanuk algorithm is selected in encryption and de-
cryption of real-time stream for secure channel since the algorithm is one of the fastest
stream cipher available.
Then, an approach called Modified Vector Quantization (MVQ) and the corre-
sponding Image metric Generation Function (IGF) are designed. In general, vector
quantization involves dividing a still image into multiple subspaces. Each subspace
constitutes a different feature descriptor which can produce a complete image metric
when combined. A pre-shared key derived from the image metric is used as a symmet-
ric key to encrypt the public key during its transmission.
The works on this study continues with the prototype development. This stage
focuses on integrating all components and cryptography modules with the VoIP stack
and the SIP server. A VoIP platform is needed in order to run the application in actual
environment. At first, a complete open-sourced application called Jitsi is considered.
After a thorough evaluation, Jitsi is discarded from the prototype development due to
high complexity of the internal codes and a lot of unnecessary components which affect
the performance of the proposed protocol. Hence, a new VoIP platform is developed
specifically for this research. VoIP stack from JAINSip is selected for cross platform
integration. A siphone is developed as a proof of concept. Siphone is a SIP’s user
agent that serves as the endpoint application and can be installed on desktop.
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After prototype development is finished, the proposed security protocol is tested in
the actual environment. Numbers of experiment are performed in order to measure the
effect of external factors on the protocol such as color variation and packet drop. A
thorough security analysis also been done against known attacks on VoIP communica-
tion. This is to ensure the reliability and applicability of the proposed security protocol.
Finally, the works on this research are finished after all of the research objectives are
achieved.
1.7 Research Contribution
The purpose of the protocol is to answer the question: How to exchange public key in
open network without relying on digital certificate? Verbal authentication is simple but
requires user to read and compare the authentication string manually over the phone.
Hence, the contribution of this study is threefold: First, an alternative security protocol
that does not rely on PKI. The shared secret is negotiated without relying on digital cer-
tificate. Second, a Modified Vector Quantization (MVQ), an improved approach that
allow a consistent generation of key string from the image frame under certain packet
lost. Image metric Generation Function (IGF), a new sequential step in generating
the image metric is also proposed. Third, the proposed security protocol eliminate the
need for user to manually read and compare the authentication string over the phone
as in verbal authentication.
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1.8 Thesis Organization
The work conducted in this thesis is presented in three chapters. This chapter provides
a brief explanation of the relative concepts in VoIP communication, research domain,
research motivation, problem statement, research objective and the contribution of this
study.
Chapter 2 describes the security concern, a number of threats against VoIP system
and their classification. Then, some of the general cryptographic algorithms used in
VoIP application are presented, including public key exchange, public key cryptogra-
phy (PKC) and encryption. The discussion of current security standard used in VoIP,
verbal authentication and other non-standard security protocol specifically developed
for VoIP is also covered in this chapter, followed by a review on image metric genera-
tion process.
Chapter 3 presents the proposed security protocol. A detailed description of pro-
tocol attributes, assumptions, complete signaling handshake and the key continuity
feature is included. The steps needed to generate the image metric using IGF based on
MVQ approach are also explained, followed by a concept visualization of MVQ and
how it differs from the old approach.
Chapter 4 demonstrates the proof of concept of the research work. A simple VoIP
application is developed to integrate with the proposed security protocol and tested in
a controlled environment. Packet drop is used to signify the network issues such as
high latency, low bandwidth, and packet lost. Then, the result of the experiments is
discussed from the perspective of protocol’s robustness, efficiency and computational
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complexity. Next, the proposed security protocol is analyzed against a number of
known threats against VoIP.
Finally, the work of this study is concluded in Chapter 5. The proposed security
protocol, method used, security analysis and the contributions of the study are summa-
rized and the future work is presented.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the underlying protocols involved in VoIP communication is very im-
portant in order to design and develop a reliable security protocol and integrate it with
the existing infrastructure. This includes Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), Session
Description Protocol (SDP) and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). Each protocol is
developed for a specific task. For instance, SIP initiates, manages, and terminates a
session while RTP handles a real-time media transmission peer-to-peer basis.
This chapter continues with a review on the threats currently faces by VoIP. A
number of existing works on VoIP security are also discussed. It begins with the cryp-
tography fundamentals such as public key exchange, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
encryption and decryption. Issues around the use of Trusted Third Party (TTP) and the
digital certificate are also highlighted. A review on image metric is also presented at
the end of this chapter.
The current security standards employed in VoIP communication are also discussed
in this chapter, particularly Secure RTP (SRTP) and its components, followed by other
non-standard protocols that have been proposed for VoIP. The existing works done in
the area of VoIP security are grouped in five groups, namely key exchange, encryption
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and decryption, signaling and media transport, standard security protocol, verbal au-
thentication and other non-standard security protocol. Figure 2.1 provides the overall
representation of the literature review conducted in this study.
2.2 Signaling and Media Transport Protocol
It is important to understand the VoIP stack and some of the major protocols involved
in VoIP communication before designing the security protocol for VoIP. VoIP stack is
a collection of network protocol that involved in VoIP communication. The working
domain of such protocols defines their position in the stack.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, VoIP stack consist of five layers. In the transport layer,
VoIP usually uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) instead of Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) to maintain the Quality of Service (QoS). TCP is connection oriented
and has to complete the three-way handshake. If using the TCP, VoIP has to wait for
packet re-transmission in the event of packet lost, thus defeat the purpose of having the
real-time communication.
In signaling layer, VoIP comes with two flavors namely H.323 protocol and Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP). Both protocols are designed to handle the media session but
has a specific approach to cater the different needs (Glasmann et al., 2003). H.323
is specifically developed to handle real-time audio and video data transmission using
VoIP-compatible terminal. Due to the proprietary signaling and media formatting,
H.323 is very good in an interfacing VoIP system with supplementary services like
PSTN and PBX network.
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Figure 2.2: VoIP stack, adapted from (Gupta and Shmatikov, 2007)
In contrast, SIP is designed to be simpler, flexible and less complex than H.323.
SIP signaling does not specify explicitly the terminal requirement. SIP gives more
effective mechanism in interacting with non-VoIP compliant terminal. SIP provides
a wider range of VoIP application, particularly in general session management that
may not necessarily involve audio and video live streaming. As a result, SIP has been
widely used as the main protocol in VoIP. Therefore, the work done in this thesis is
focused on the security issue for SIP-based VoIP system.
SIP initiates, manages and terminates the session while Session Description Pro-
tocol (SDP) describe the format for media transfer. After the session is established,
RTP takes over the session and begin transmitting the media stream. SIP and SDP are
text-based protocol and did not provide any security layer.
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2.2.1 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling protocol for multimedia communication
which includes VoIP, multi-conference, and IP telephony. It was developed by Inter-
net Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1996 and designed to be independent from the
underlying network. RFC 3261 describes a detailed specification of the signaling data
and the required stack (Rosenberg et al., 2002). It has three primary functions which
are service invitation, parameter synchronization and service termination. Instead of
using numerical addresses to identify participant, SIP uses an email-like address that
is easy to remember and unique across the globe.
SIP has two modes of communication, namely Stateful and Stateless. Stateful re-
tain session ID and persisted until the end of the session, keeping all challenge and
response handshake in a single dialog. In Stateless mode, every SIP signal is a new
and independent signal, thus allowing a simple handshake. SIP is a text-based pro-
tocol and functions according to challenge and response mechanism. This keeps the
VoIP implementation simple and very flexible. Below is the example of a SIP INVITE
message sent from Alice to Bob:
To: Bob <sip:bob@example.com>
From: Alice <sip:alice@example.com>;
tag= 0gh4d
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP a.example.com;
branch= z5kH3bKshEQ
CSeq: 76298 INVITE
Call-ID: 74622011@example.com
Content-type: application/sdp
From chronology perspective, VoIP session can be divided into three phases namely
call setup, data streaming, and session tear down. Figure 2.3 illustrates the SIP signal-
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Figure 2.3: SIP protocol handshake between Alice and Bob (Wang and Liu, 2010)
ing between Alice and Bob before and after the session ended. During call setup,
Alice initiates the calling process by sending INVITE signal and wait for a 200 OK
signal from Bob. The INVITE message contains the SDP payload to synchronize the
parameter and format needed for audio and video streaming between her and Bob.
VoIP session is established once Alice receives the response signal and replies with
the ACK signal to Bob to complete the handshake. The data streaming phase begins
once Alice and Bob became a VoIP participant. RTP takes over the session by initiat-
ing real-time audio and video data transmission process on the specified port. During
session tear down phase, Bob sends BYE signal to Alice and she replies with 200 OK
signal to end the VoIP session. At this stage, all UDP connection is terminated and
VoIP stack is reset.
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The fact that SIP is a text-based protocol has made it seriously exposed to various
network threats (Dantu et al., 2009). For example, adversary can exploit the content
of the SIP message for malicious purposes, particularly eavesdropping and imperson-
ation. For instance, INVITE message contain call data such as ID of participant, ses-
sion ID as well as the next proxy server. The adversary can intercept the message,
replaces the originator’s ID and makes the receiver response to his terminal.
Given the vulnerability of the underlying network, communicating secret infor-
mation through VoIP is dangerous. User authentication is needed to mitigate such
situation. Unfortunately, SIP does not provide any authentication layer to validate the
originality and integrity of a message (Butcher et al., 2007). It has to rely on other
protocol to create the secure channel and preserve the session privacy.
2.2.2 Session Description Protocol (SDP)
Session Description Protocol (SDP) is a protocol for describing the format of the
streamed media for the purpose of session initiation and parameter negotiation. As
illustrated in Figure 2.2, SDP works on session description layer of VoIP stack. The
protocol is described in detail in RFC 2327 (Handley and Jacobson, 1998).
Both communicating parties may not have the same computer specification, operat-
ing system, input hardware and quality of network connection. For instance, Alice and
Bob will have a different user agent with a different set of specification and network
strength. Although Alice has a higher bandwidth and can support a full high defini-
tion video, Bob may need to settle with a lower resolution due to his poor Internet
connection.
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Due to these circumstances, Alice and Bob need to agree on a same set of format
for audio and video that can satisfy both needs. In such situation, Alice and Bob will
exchange SDP containing the expected session profile and begin the RTP session once
both parties synchronized. SDP is included in the INVITE message sent by the caller.
Similar to SIP, SDP does not provide any cryptography mechanism to make a secure
communication. However, it can serve as a host for carrying a relevant key materials
for the security handshake (Gupta and Shmatikov, 2007). Table 2.1 shows some of the
SDP options and the example of the corresponding attributes.
Table 2.1: SDP options and its usage
Options Usage Exmple
v The version of protocol 0
o Source and session identi-
fier
alice 5624825461 5624825461 IN IP4
a.example.com
s The name of session SDP Seminar
c The information about the
connection
IN IP4 192.0.2.101
t Time of the session is ac-
tive
0 0
m Media description audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0
a More attributes rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
2.2.3 Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is a standard protocol to handle multimedia data
in real-time transmission either unicast or multicast. This protocol is specified in RFC
3550 (Schulzrinne et al., 2003). The protocol is commonly used in Internet telephony
application such as VoIP.
22
Real time audio and video streaming require every packet to arrive at the intended
destination in a timely manner. RTP is developed based on UDP and able to tolerate
certain degree of packet lost. In order to keep things synchronized, RTP does not wait
for the sender to resend the lost packet (Zourzouvillys and Rescorla, 2010). Instead, it
will skip to the next received packet and re-order accordingly based on the sequence
number. The error correction algorithm will try to make the packet lost unnoticeable
to the user. If RTP is designed based on TCP, the protocol will have to send a re-
transmit signal to the sender and wait for the packet to arrive. This will cause a lot of
unnecessary delay and does not signify the purpose of having the real-time streaming.
RTP works in tandem with SIP to create a full duplex communication channel be-
tween the endpoints (Zourzouvillys and Rescorla, 2010). It uses the sister protocol,
Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) to control and monitor the data trans-
mission. Every endpoint will exchange RTCP packet periodically to monitor the media
quality. This allows RTP to detect any packet loss and compensate the packet delay.
RTP and RTCP are independent from the underlying network and transport pro-
tocol. However, RTCP packet is exchanged separately from the RTP packet using
two different ports. The adversary can exploit the RTCP packet if the protocol is not
secured properly.
RTP is not designed for secure communication. However, the protocol is very
flexible in the sense that the input and output stream can be modified before the trans-
mission. Security in RTP is achieved by performing encryption and decryption using
the cipher algorithm on the input and output stream. Input data is XORed with the
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continuous random bits from Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) to become
cipher text and placed into the payload. Once the packet is received by the intended
receiver, the payload will be converted back to the plain text using the same key.
2.3 Threats Against VoIP
Each threat faced by VoIP is categorized based on their effect on Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability (Butcher et al., 2007). Essentially, Confidentiality threats
breach the session privacy and expose the content of the conversation to the adversary.
Integrity threats jeopardize the accountability of the caller, the message and the recip-
ient while Availability threats mean the inability of VoIP user to make and receive the
call. Availability threats was not part of the research focus since the attacks are mainly
caused by the underlying IP network which lead to the Denial of Service attack (DOS).
The solution for this issue is very similar to the DOS attack on the network infrastruc-
ture (Butcher et al., 2007). As mentioned by (2008), the only way to secure VoIP is
by encrypting its media content. Hence, this study focuses on the threats against Con-
fidentiality and Integrity aspect of the VoIP session which is not protected eventhough
the network infrastructure is well secured.
Eavesdrop and impersonation are two terms that often be associated with VoIP.
Eavesdrop is when the adversary silently listens to the victim’s conversation without
their consent (Butcher et al., 2007). The adversary could retrieve the meaningful in-
formation and use it to gain control over user’s credentials. Session privacy is loss as
conversation is exposed plainly to the adversary. Survey has shown that the eavesdrop-
ping constitutes 20 percent of VoIP vulnerabilities (Keromytis, 2010).
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